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Over three years have passed since the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) was passed
by Congress. One of the remarkable and ground-breaking provisions of the act was the
ex parte seizure provision. With its inherent expediency and the element of surprise,
the ex parte seizure provision found instant appeal among the trade secret owner
community. But the opponents saw a provision ripe for abuse and anti-competitive
behaviour. In the three years since its enactment, the ex parte seizure provision has
been used sparingly. Plaintiffs have found other provisions equally effective or at least
“good enough.” Even when plaintiffs sought ex parte seizure, the courts often found
other available remedies—such as Rule 65 temporary restraining orders (TRO)—
sufficient for the desired protection. This article provides a background and overview
of the DTSA and its jurisprudence. The philosophical and policy underpinnings behind
the inclusion of the ex-parte seizure provision are described to provide the appropriate
context. The article then takes a retrospective look at the concerns raised by
(primarily) the academic community highlighting the potential for abuse, and assesses
if such concerns played out in reality. Further, the effectiveness of the seizure
provision, especially in light of alternative provisions available, is also investigated.
Finally, recommendations are made for potential reforms to improve the predictability
and probability of success of ex parte seizure requests in future applications.
Specifically, a multi-factor test focusing on the defendant’s characteristics is proposed
to determine the circumstances where a Rule 65 remedy could be used with the same
effect as the seizure provision. A second multi-factor test is then proposed as a
framework to analyse the likelihood and propriety of ex parte seizure grants.

Cite as Sachin Bhatmuley, Defend Trade Secrets Act and The Seizure Provision: Useful
or Superfluous?, 19 UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 218 (2020).

DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT AND THE SEIZURE PROVISION:
USEFUL OR SUPERFLUOUS?
SACHIN BHATMULEY
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 218
II. DTSA AND EX-PARTE SEIZURE PROVISION ............................................................... 219
A. Trade Secret Law and UTSA ........................................................................... 219
B. Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) ................................................................... 221
C. Ex Parte Seizure Provision .............................................................................. 222
1. Supporters’ Views ..................................................................................... 223
2. Opponents’ Views ...................................................................................... 224
III. EX PARTE SEIZURE JURISPRUDENCE ....................................................................... 224
A. Trademark Law and Lanham Act Seizures .................................................... 224
B. Ex Parte Seizure Granted Without the DTSA ............................................... 225
C. The Seizure Provision Under DTSA ............................................................... 227
IV. HOW EFFECTIVE HAS IT BEEN? ............................................................................... 229
A. Why Was Seizure Granted .............................................................................. 229
1. The Nature of Trade Secret ...................................................................... 230
2. Defendant’s Profile .................................................................................... 230
B. Why Seizure Was Denied................................................................................. 230
C. Did the Risk of Abuse Materialize? ................................................................. 232
D. Over Three Years In – Who Was Right? ......................................................... 233
E. Is Any Reform Necessary? ............................................................................... 234
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 236
VI. Appendix ................................................................................................................. 237

[19:218 2020]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property

218

DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT AND THE SEIZURE PROVISION:
USEFUL OR SUPERFLUOUS?
SACHIN BHATMULEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been over three years since the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) was
passed by Congress.1 In addition to creating a federal civil cause of action from trade
secret misappropriation, one of the remarkable and arguably groundbreaking
provisions of the act was the ex parte seizure provision. With its inherent expediency
and the element of surprise, the ex parte seizure provision found instant appeal among
the trade secret owner community.2 But, the opponents saw in it a provision ripe for
abuse and anti-competitive behavior.3 To address these concerns, Congress included
constraints in the operation of the seizure provision to limit it to a narrow set of
situations.
Even though several empirical studies on the DTSA jurisprudence in its first year
are available,4 those studies have not specifically focused on seizure provision, nor have
they been updated in the recent past. In the three years since its enactment, the
seizure provision has been used only sparingly. Plaintiffs have found other provisions
equally effective or “good enough,” given the high bar of “extraordinary circumstances”
required by the courts for ex parte seizure grants.5 Even when plaintiffs sought ex parte
seizure, the courts often found other available remedies—most often Rule 65
temporary restraining orders (TRO)—sufficient for the desired protection.6
Nevertheless, the courts have started to identify situations in which the seizure
provision is found appropriate. The nature of the trade secret—often electronic
information that can be easily destroyed and disseminated—coupled with the
defendant’s computer proficiency and prior conduct, namely misrepresentation and
disregard for prior court orders, appear to weigh strongly in favor of granting the

* © 2020 Sachin Bhatmuley. Author is a graduate of the University of San Diego School of Law
‘19. Author sincerely thanks Prof. Ted Sichelman for his valuable guidance and unwavering support.
1 S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2015-2016).
2 Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 829, 854-55 (2018) (“The effect of this cost shifting results in anticompetitive
behavior, is ripe for abuse, and offers no added benefit to what is provided via state trade secret causes
of action and remedies.”).
3 Id. at 856-57.
4 David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First
Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 106, 150 (2018) (“the
statutory ex parte seizure remedy has been a little-used provision by trade secret plaintiffs. Out of
486 cases in the dataset, only 2% (10 cases) involve a motion for an ex parte seizure. In only two cases
was an ex parte seizure granted. Courts denied a seizure in seven other cases, and there was no
decision in the remaining case.”).
5 Panera, LLC v. Nettles, No. 4:16-CV-1181-JAR, 2016 WL 4124114, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2016).
6 Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra, No. 2:16-CV-524-PPS-JEM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22656
(N.D. Ind., Feb. 17, 2017); OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2343, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2017).

[19:218 2020]

DTSA and The Seizure Provision: Useful or Superfluous?

219

seizure provision.7 Even in these situations, courts have attempted to further restrict
the scope of seizures to narrowly defined articles, sometimes to even a single laptop or
one document.8 The sparse use of ex parte seizure grants notwithstanding, the vague
language in the statute for “extraordinary circumstances” nevertheless has potential
for ongoing confusion.9 But, the courts have largely avoided any widespread abuse of
the provision and have limited ex parte seizure orders to narrowly defined targets while
also providing guidance on what is considered an “extraordinary circumstance” worthy
of the seizure provision.10
Part I of this paper provides a background and overview of the DTSA. The
philosophical and policy underpinnings behind the inclusion of the ex-parte seizure
provision are briefly described to provide the appropriate context. Similarly, the
opposing view, theorizing that the existing mechanisms in UTSA were sufficient and
that the potential for abuse and weaponization of the seizure provision make it
unnecessary, is also explored.
Part II briefly surveys the jurisprudence involving the seizure provision over the
past three years since its enactment. Of the forty cases where the seizure provision
was either requested or ordered, the early patterns suggest that the courts are
reluctant and hesitant in finding the “extraordinary circumstances” required by the
act to grant ex parte seizure. But, by mid-2017, the courts started to define specific
circumstances that would satisfy the “extraordinary circumstances” criterion and
granted ex parte seizure in nearly a third of the cases where such relief was requested.
Part III takes a retrospective look at the concerns raised (primarily) by the
academic community highlighting the potential for abuse of the seizure provision and
assesses if such concerns played out. Further, the effectiveness of the seizure provision,
especially considering alternative provisions available to plaintiffs and the courts, is
also investigated. Finally, recommendations are made for potential reforms to improve
its predictability and probability of success for future application. Specifically, a multifactor test is proposed to determine the circumstances where a Rule 65 remedy could
be used to the same effect as the seizure provision. This test primarily focuses on the
defendant’s characteristics. A second multi-factor test is then proposed as a framework
to analyze the likelihood and propriety of ex parte seizure grants.
II. DTSA AND EX-PARTE SEIZURE PROVISION
A. Trade Secret Law and UTSA
A trade secret typically comprises of valuable, proprietary information or “knowhow” that a business protects from use by competitors by taking reasonable efforts to

7 Axis Steel Detailing, Inc. v. Prilex Detailing Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 2:17-cv-00428-JNP, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 221339 at *4 (D. Utah June 29, 2017).
8 Thoroughbred Ventures, LLC v. Disman, No. 4:18-CV-00318, 2018, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
133697, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2018).
9 See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 2, at 895-96.
10 See Axis, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221339, at *2.
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maintain its secrecy.11 The Supreme Court explained in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp
that there are important public interests compelling protection of trade secrets.12
Trade secrets are arguably the most litigated and the most important form of
intellectual property.13 Friedman, Landes, and Posner suggest that firms may prefer
trade secrecy (to other forms of IP protection, such as patents) because it is more costeffective than seeking other formal protection for their innovation, especially when the
innovation is minor, or the firm is either too inexperienced or lacks resources.14
Alternatively, the firm may simply not want to disclose the innovation to the public
due to its secrecy being central to the firm’s competitiveness and (even) existence (e.g.,
Coca-Cola). The essential rights of a trade secret owner are the right to use the trade
secret and the right to disclose it to employees and others within a confidential or
contractual relationship, subject to restrictions on unauthorized use or disclosure.15
The majority of trade secret misappropriation thus tends to be an “inside job,” often
committed by departing or disgruntled employees or business partners.16 When key
employees depart, there is a real threat that the trade secrets have already been stolen
and may be shared with a future employer, perhaps even a competitor. However, there
is often no evidence of this until after damage to the business is done.17
Historically, trade secret causes of action evolved from state common law. The
1939 Restatement of Torts § 757 summarized the then-common law relating to trade
secrets.18 The classic definition of trade secrets is stated in comment b of § 757.19 Under
the Restatement, wrongful disclosure and wrongful use of a trade secret were
actionable. Posner and Landes posited that historically, trade secret misappropriation
relied for the most part on wrongdoing that was independent of any "trade secret law,"
relying instead, for example, on a breach of contract or trespass claim.20
Beginning in the 1980s, states began to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“UTSA”). The UTSA largely codified the common law but added a few features, such
as potential statutory increases in damages and discretionary attorneys’ fees.21 The
UTSA’s substantive aspect closely paralleled the 1939 Restatement except that the
UTSA had no requirement that, to be protected, information must be used in one’s
trade or business. Further, courts continued to determine whether a matter is a trade
secret by using the comment b six-factor test.22
11 David Bohrer, Threatened Misappropriation of Trade Secrets: Making a Federal (DTSA) Case
Out of It, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH L.J. 506, 511 (2017).
12 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482-83, 485-86 (1974).
13 Josh Lerner, The Importance of Trade Secrecy: Evidence from Civil Litigation (Harvard Bus.
Sch., Working Paper No. 95-043, 1999).
14 See David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of Trade Secret Law. 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 63–
70 (1991).
15 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (119th ed. 2019).
16 See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 2, at 857.
17 See id. at 857, 901.
18 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939).
19 Id. at cmt. b (“A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”).
20 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 355 (2003).
21 1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 15, at § 1.01.
22 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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The UTSA’s procedural aspect required a showing that the information in
question was the subject of efforts “reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain . . . secrecy.”23 In addition, the UTSA did not preempt contract claims
(whether or not based on the same facts).
The UTSA also provided for and codified injunctive relief in case of actual or
threatened misappropriation. Because injunctive relief was now available for
threatened misappropriation, a trade secret owner did not have to wait until
misappropriation had occurred to seek injunctive relief. “Threatened”
misappropriation comprised of both a statement of an intent to misappropriate a trade
secret, and a circumstance that is likely to result in the misappropriation of a trade
secret.24 In exceptional circumstances, the injunction may condition future use upon
payment of a reasonable royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use
could have been prohibited.25
The UTSA has now been adopted by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
in one form or another since its promulgation.26 However, not all states have adopted
or interpreted the UTSA in the same manner, particularly the provisions regarding
threatened misappropriation.27
B. Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA)
On May 11, 2016, Congress signed into law the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016
(“DTSA”). DTSA, for the first time, created a federal civil cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation, in contrast to the Economic Espionage Act (‘EEA”) of 1996,
which had created a federal criminal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.
Prior to the EEA, there was no federal civil or criminal law directed specifically at
trade secret misappropriation by private actors. EEA provided for criminal penalties
for two forms of trade secret theft: (1) espionage on behalf of a foreign entity and (2)
theft of trade secrets for pecuniary gain (regardless of who benefits).28 But no federal
civil cause of action existed for trade secret theft in the EEA. In the second decade of
the 21st century, the high-profile case of Delaware based DuPont’s trade secret
misappropriations by Kolon Industries,29 a Korean firm, prompted Delaware Senator
Coons and the Congress to take action.30 In July 2015, Sen. Coons and other lawmakers
1 MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 15, at § 1.01.
Id. at § 101 n. 51.2.
25 Id. at § 101.
26 See, id.; see also Trade Secrets Laws and the UTSA: 50 State and Federal Law Survey, BECK
REED RIDEN, LLP (last updated Aug 8. 2018), http://www.beckreedriden.com/trade-secrets-laws-andthe-utsa-a-50-state-and-federal-law-survey-chart (“As of 2018, every state but Massachusetts and
New York has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the UTSA) in one form or another. (There is
some debate about whether Alabama or North Carolina actually adopted the UTSA; the Uniform Law
Commissioners say that Alabama has adopted it, while North Carolina has not.”)).
27 Id.
28 Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2018).
29 E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 269 F.R.D. 600, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77075
(E.D. Va. 2010).
30 Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2011, S. Amend. 729, S. 1619, 112th Cong.
(2011), reprinted in 157 CONG. REC. S6229-S6230 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2011) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1836(a)(2), 1836(b)(4)(A)-(B)) (authorizing injunctive relief, damages for actual loss due to the
23
24
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introduced identical bills in the House and Senate called the Defend Trade Secrets Act
of 2015.31
Among other things, the bills would modify the EEA to permit the “owner of a
trade secret” to “bring a civil action” if “the person is aggrieved by the misappropriation
of a trade secret that is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in,
interstate or foreign commerce;” authorize “seizure of property necessary to prevent
the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of the action”
upon an ex parte application, subject to numerous requirements; create a cause of
action for a person damaged by a “wrongful or excessive seizure” order and authorize
monetary damages, attorney's fees, and punitive damages in cases of bad faith; and
reaffirm that the EEA/DTSA would not “preempt or displace any other remedies,
whether civil or criminal . . . for the misappropriation of a trade secret” under federal,
state, or local law.32
Following several amendments triggered by, among other things, feedback (and
pushback) from academics, and after further aligning the provisions of the bills with
the existing state laws, Congress approved the bill, which was then signed into law by
President Obama on May 11, 2016.33
C. Ex Parte Seizure Provision
The most innovative, and arguably the most discussed feature of the DTSA was
the seizure provision, enabling trade secret owners to obtain seizure orders on an ex
parte basis. Ex parte seizure was the most notable aspect of the DTSA that set it apart
from the UTSA. Neither the UTSA nor any state trade secret law had a trade secretspecific ex parte seizure process.34 This seizure provision would allow the plaintiff an
avenue to obtain an order on an ex parte basis to seize from the defendant the allegedly
misappropriated trade secret.
The seizure provision, because of its potential to inflict quick and powerful impact,
was subject to eight well-articulated requirements and may be ordered only in
“extraordinary circumstances.”
To issue an ex parte seizure order, a court must first find that other forms of
extraordinary relief, such as a temporary restraining order, would be inadequate
because the restrained party would evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply.35 Second,
the court must find that the applicant will suffer “immediate and irreparable injury”
without the order.36 Third, the harm the applicant will suffer should “outweigh the
harm to the legitimate interests” of the defendant.37 Fourth, the court must find that

misappropriation, and disgorgement of any unjust enrichment due to the misappropriation to the
extent not considered in calculating actual damages).
31 S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted); H.R. 3326, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).
32 Id.
33 162 Cong Rec D 501 (May 12, 2016).
34 Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
284, 285 (2015).
35 Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2018).
36 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II).
37 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(III).
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the applicant will likely succeed at trial on the merits of its misappropriation claim.38
Fifth, the person against whom seizure is ordered must have actual possession of the
trade secret and any property to be seized.39 Sixth, the court must find that if the
applicant provided notice before the issuance of the order, the defendant would destroy,
move, hide, or otherwise make the alleged trade secret inaccessible.40 Seventh, the
application should describe with reasonable particularity the matter to be seized and,
to the extent reasonable under the circumstances, identify the location where the
matter is to be seized.41 Finally, the applicant must not have publicized the requested
seizure.42
Like the security requirement with temporary restraining orders, the DTSA
plaintiff must provide security (i.e. bond) for the payment of damages to the defendant
in case of a wrongful or excessive seizure.43 Further, the court may order only “the
narrowest seizure of property necessary” to protect the alleged trade secret.44
Moreover, the seizure must be “conducted in a manner that minimizes any
interruption of the business operations of third parties” and, to the extent possible,
must not interrupt the legitimate operations of the defendant.45
The DTSA requires a hearing no later than seven days after an ex parte seizure
order is issued.46 In the hearing, the court will determine if the order should be
modified or dissolved, and if the seizure was wrongful or excessive.47 In the event of a
wrongful or excessive seizure, the defendant can recover damages for any lost profits,
cost of materials, and loss of goodwill caused by the seizure, as well as reasonable and
necessary attorney’s fees.48 The defendant may also recover punitive damages upon a
showing that the plaintiff sought the seizure in bad faith.49
1. Supporters’ Views
The primary motivation for the supporters and sponsors to promulgate the DTSA
was to introduce a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. This
was spurred on by actual cases of and threats of industrial espionage by foreign
corporations against American companies.50 Specifically, the supporters contended
that the existing state trade secret laws varied significantly in their treatment of trade
secrets and that a harmonized federal law or a “single national baseline” for trade
secret protection was necessary. They further contended that trade secret owners
would benefit from access to federal courts just as with other intellectual property
owners. In addition, the supporters believed that the seizure provision would provide
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV).
Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(V).
40 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VII).
41 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VI).
42 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VIII).
43 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(vi).
44 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(ii).
45 Id.
46 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(v).
47 See § 1836(b)(2)(F).
48 See § 1836(b)(2)(G).
49 Goldman, supra note 34, at 285.
50 See E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 269 F.R.D. 600 (E.D. Va. 2010).
38
39
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an expeditious avenue to prevent dissemination of trade secrets and/or to preserve
evidence of misappropriation.51
2. Opponents’ Views52
The opposition to the DTSA primarily came from the academic community. In a
letter to the Congress, forty-two academics highlighted their opposition to the DTSA
and concerns regarding its provisions.53 Specifically, they contended that the seizure
provision language in the DTSA is “impermissibly vague,” and therefore contains
significant potential to cause anticompetitive harm, especially to small businesses and
startups.54 Further, they feared that the DTSA implicitly recognized the so-called
inevitable disclosure doctrine, which permitted trade secret holders to obtain
injunctive relief against a former employee if the employee's new job “will inevitably
lead [him or her] to rely on the plaintiff's trade secrets.”55 This, they feared, would be
in conflict with existing laws in some states, like California.56 Another concern
expressed was that the DTSA would likely increase the length and cost of trade secret
litigation, including through the liberal discovery permitted under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and would result in less uniformity.57
As for the remedies, the opponents contended that the remedies already available
to trade secret owners, including those in ex parte proceedings like TRO, were
sufficient, and that the additional benefit provided by the ex parte seizure provision
created a disproportionate risk of anti-competitive seizures and harm to smaller (and
innocent) parties. The opponents found the DTSA safeguards “miscalibrated” to
achieve the desired protections against abusive seizures.58 They suggested that the
highly fact-sensitive nature of the trade secret cases required adversarial proceedings,
and that the additional safeguards in ex parte seizures would not address the question
of accurate factual determinations.59
III. EX PARTE SEIZURE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Trademark Law and Lanham Act Seizures
The Lanham Act (also known as the Trademark Act of 1946) authorized the
issuance of civil seizure orders, codified under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), to permit trademark
plaintiffs “to preserve the evidence necessary to bring trademark counterfeiters to
51 See, e.g., Sandeen, supra note 2 at 855 (“Numerous large industrial, high–technology, and
pharmaceutical and medical device firms promoted enactment of the DTSA . . . .”).
52 Id. at 856.
53 Id. at 857.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 858.
58 See Goldman, supra note 34, at 287.
59 Id.
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justice.”60 The trademark law civil seizure remedy is available for a violation that
consists of using a counterfeit mark.61 Under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d), a court may, upon
application, issue an ex parte seizure order “providing for the seizure of goods and
counterfeit marks involved in such violation and the means of making such marks, and
records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved in such
violation.”62 The statute requires, among other things, that the United States Attorney
in the district where the order is sought be notified,63 and that the application be based
on an affidavit or similar sworn document.64 A party seeking a seizure order must post
a bond against claims of wrongful seizure, and the court must hold a hearing between
ten and fifteen days after the issuance of ex parte seizure.65
Because we are focused primarily on the seizure provision in the context of trade
secrets, seizure jurisprudence under 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) will not be reviewed in any
further detail, but contextual awareness of it is nonetheless useful to understand the
justifications and rationale for ex parte seizure jurisprudence under the DTSA.
B. Ex Parte Seizure Granted Without the DTSA
As it turns out, the courts had considered and granted ex parte seizures under
Fed. Rule Civ. P. 65(b) even when the plaintiffs had not specifically asked for ex parte
seizure under DTSA, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2). Under Rule 65(b)(1), trade secret owners
could seek ex parte TROs that could include impoundment. An ex parte TRO with
impoundment under Rule 65(b)(1) operates similar to § 1836(b)(2) ex parte seizure in
that both are ex parte proceedings. No notice of the complaint is provided to the
defendant, nor is the defendant present during the proceedings that result in the
judge’s order. There is however, one key difference between a Rule 65(b)(1) TRO and
the seizure provision. A TRO with impoundment under Rule 65(b)(1) is directed to and
served on the defendant without the express involvement of law enforcement
authorities. The TRO demands the defendant to turn over the pertinent property upon
service. As such, it promises to be less intrusive and disruptive for defendants.
The seizure provision on the other hand, orders the United States Marshals
Service (“U.S. Marshal”) to seize the identified property as soon as possible. While most
of the showings required for the seizure provision are identical to those for a Rule
65(b)(1) TRO, the seizure provision requires the plaintiff to make an additional
showing of “extraordinary circumstances” to justify the involvement of a U.S. Marshal.
A Rule 65(b)(1) TRO could provide an alternative remedy to plaintiffs and could
likely address the need for an expedited action satisfactorily, but it may fall short if a
defendant has the means and the motivation to evade the TRO. The defendant could
thus continue to inflict harm on the plaintiff by rapidly destroying or disseminating
the trade secrets in question by ignoring or evading the TRO. If a defendant indeed
proceeds to do that, the potential consequence to a plaintiff could be catastrophic at
In re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir.2004).
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2018).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
60
61

[19:218 2020]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property

226

times. For example, if the trade secret in question is the cornerstone (or the sole reason)
of the plaintiff’s business advantage (e.g. Coca-Cola formula or Google search
algorithm), relying on the defendant’s compliance with a Rule 65 TRO would effectively
eliminate the plaintiff’s chances of seeking any meaningful relief if the defendant
chooses to ignore or evade the Rule 65 TRO. The seizure provision thus promises a
quick and effective solution to stop further dissemination and destruction of the
misappropriated trade secrets.
On the other hand, trade secret misappropriation situations could be highly factsensitive in that the allegedly misappropriated information may turn out to be, inter
alia, not a trade secret after all. Without the benefit of adversarial proceedings to tease
out the facts, the seizure provision threatens to disrupt business operations of an
innocent (or unprepared) defendant. Not to mention reputational and goodwill harm
resulting from the U.S. Marshal raiding the business. A Rule 65 TRO thus aims to
maintain the status quo to ensure that the plaintiff gets immediate relief, while also
saving the defendant the ignominy of a U.S. Marshal’s raid.
The Committee Notes on Rules to the 2001 amendment provide additional
guidelines referring to a similar provision in trademark law and cases in trademark
law further illustrating the required showing to justify ex parte impoundment.66
In Panera v. Nettles, et. al,67 the plaintiffs did not request an ex parte seizure.
Instead, a request was made for a temporary restraining order (TRO) under Rule 65(b)
to have the defendant turn over, inter alia, his personal laptop and any other devices
that contained information relating to Panera. The court granted the request asking
the defendant to turn over his laptop to a forensic expert. Similarly, in Earthbound
Corporation v. MiTek USA, Inc.,68 the court granted the TRO requiring the defendants
to turn over the misappropriated thumb drives pursuant to Rule 65(b). Neither of these
were ex parte proceedings.
In Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra,69 the court used Rule 65(b) ex parte
impoundment provision to grant ex parte seizure of defendant’s laptop. There, the court
relied on Rule 65(b) TRO and found it adequate to sidestep the issue of the DTSA and
its (higher) showing of “extraordinary circumstances” required to grant ex parte seizure
under 18 U.S.C § 1836(b)(2). Curiously, the court justified the ex parte TRO
impoundment in Magnesita Refractories by citing Panera v. Nettles, et. al and
Earthbound Corporation v. MiTek USA, Inc, neither of which in fact were ex parte TRO
proceedings. Magnesita Refractories remains good law and does not show any negative
appellate history so far.

66 FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (“Impoundment may be ordered on an ex parte basis under subdivision (b) if
the applicant makes a strong showing of the reasons why notice is likely to defeat effective
relief . . . .”).
67 Panera, 2016 WL 4124114, at *2-4.
68 Earthbound Corporation v. MiTek USA, Inc., No. C16-1150 RSM. 2016 WL 4418013, at *11
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2016).
69 Magnesita Refractories Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10204.
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C. The Seizure Provision Under DTSA
The first case requesting ex parte seizure under DTSA § 1836(b)(2) is Dazzle
Software II, LLC v. Kinney.70 In Dazzle, filed just a month after the DTSA was signed
into law by President Obama, the plaintiff sought ex parte seizure of computer storage
devices and computers in a third party’s possession. The court declined, without
explanation, to grant the requested relief on an ex parte basis and instructed plaintiffs
to serve the application on defendants. The court did not provide any § 1836(b)(2)
analysis for its rejection nor did it specifically provide reasons for proceeding with a
hearing under Rule 65(b). The court later dismissed the DTSA claims altogether
stating that the misappropriation took place before the DTSA was enacted.
Between June 2016 and March 2017, a string of cases followed that sought the ex
parte seizure remedy, but the courts rejected each time, and instead granted alternate
remedies such as a TRO (in most cases), and an NDA (in one case – Sapienza v. Trahan
et al71).
In Balearia Caribbean Ltd., Corp., v. Calvo,72 the court granted the TRO but
denied ex parte seizure. In its rejection, the court referred to the DTSA’s legislative
history and pointed to the DTSA’s applicability only in “extraordinary circumstances”
such as in “instances in which a defendant is seeking to flee the country or planning to
disclose the trade secret to a third party immediately or is otherwise not amenable to
the enforcement of the court’s orders.”73 The court cited AT&T Broadband v. Tech
Commc’ns, Inc.,74 under Cable Communications Policy Act (“CCPA”) explaining that
(an ex parte seizure order under CCPA) “must show that the defendant, or persons
involved in similar activities, had concealed evidence or disregarded court orders in
the past.” Finally, in the Lanham Act context, the court found the seizure provision
appropriate only “where destruction of evidence is likely and where entities similar to
the defendants had a history of destroying evidence and disobeying court orders.”75 The
Balearia court did not find any of these circumstances and thus denied the ex parte
seizure opting in favor of a TRO instead.
Subsequently, in Jones Printing LLC v. Adams Lithographing Company,76 OOO
Brunswick Rail Management v. Sultanov et al,77 OOO Brunswick Rail Management v.
Ostling,78 and Unum Group v. Loftus,79 various district courts engaged in similar
70 Dazzle Software II, LLC v. Kinney, No. 16-cv-12191, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155992 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 22, 2016).
71 Sapienza v. Trahan, No. 16-CV-01701, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200319, at *29 (W.D. La. Oct. 23,
2017).
72 Balearia Caribbean, Corp. v. Calvo, No. 16-23300-CIV, 2017 WL 8780944 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3,
2017).
73 Protection of Trade Secrets: Overview of Current Law and Legislation, CONGR.RES. SERV. REP.
(Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43714.html
74 AT&T Broadband v. Tech Commc’ns, Inc., 381 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004).
75 Balearia Caribbean, Corp. v. Calvo, No. 16-23300-KMV (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2016),
76 Jones Printing LLC v. Adams Lithographing Co., No. 1-16-cv-00442, Dkt. 8 (E.D. Tenn. Nov 3,
2016).
77 OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Sultanov, No. 5:17-CV-00017-EJD, 2017 WL 67119 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 6, 2017).
78 OOO Brunswick Rail Mgmt. v. Ostling, No. 3:17-CV-00114 (ACV), 2017 WL 8948259 (D. Conn.
Nov. 13, 2017).
79 Unum Grp. v. Loftus, 220 F. Supp. 3d 143 (D. Mass. 2016).
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reasoning to ultimately find Rule 65 adequate for effective relief and did not find the
“extraordinary circumstances” necessary for the ex parte seizure relief under
§ 1836(b)(2).
The courts appeared to weigh the potential harm of an ex parte seizure to an
unprepared (or an otherwise compliant) defendant heavily over the needs of a plaintiff
potentially at risk of losing some commercial advantage. As a practical consequence, it
became obvious that courts were unwilling to order ex parte seizure without the higher
showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Nevertheless, no meaningful guidance
emerged from these cases to guide plaintiffs to determine situations that would meet
the elusive “extraordinary circumstances” criterion.
In what may be the first case (Mission Capital Advisors LLC v. Romaka, filed in
June 2016) where ex parte seizure was sought and ultimately (albeit only partially)
granted, employer Mission Capital Advisors sought ex parte seizure as well as Rule 65
preliminary injunction (PI) and TRO, accusing ex-employee Romaka of trade secret
theft. 80 Mission Capital had apparently managed to image Romaka’s home computer
before filing the complaint and was therefore able to identify the nature and the
location of some of the misappropriated trade secrets (e.g., a contact list) with
particularity. The court granted ex parte seizure for the contact list but denied it for
the remaining allegedly misappropriated information stating that the confidentiality
and the ensuing irreparable harm if such information was disclosed, was not stated
with particularity and hence ex parte seizure was not warranted. In granting the
seizure on the contact list, the court noted that Romaka did not appear at a show cause
hearing and had evaded service on two occasions in the past. Given this prior history
of evasive conduct, the court reasoned that Rule 65 would be inadequate in providing
effective relief with respect to the highly-proprietary contact list.
Starting with AVX Corporation v. Kim,81 filed in March 2017 in the District Court
in South Carolina, and soon thereafter in Axis Steel Detailing v. Prilex Detailing,82 filed
in May 2017 in the District Court in Utah, a somewhat discernible pattern started to
emerge where the district courts found “extraordinary circumstances” required for
granting ex parte seizure. The defendants’ familiarity and proficiency with computer
and software tools coupled with their history of prior lies and non-compliance with
court orders seemed to be common denominators in both cases.
In AVX Corporation v. Kim, employee Kim, a software engineer, had repeatedly
lied to his employer about his conduct and about having possessed the trade secrets.
The court reasoned that “Kim’s likelihood to evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply with
such an order is demonstrated by his deceptive actions when he repeatedly lied and
attempted to conceal the fact that he surreptitiously accessed and downloaded the
Stolen Computer Files.” Addressing the second requirement of § 1836(b)(2), the court
reasoned that “[a]n immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such seizure is not
80 Complaint at 1, Mission Capital Advisors LLC v. Romaka, No. 16-CV-5878 (RA), 2016 WL
11517040 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2016) (“Romaka’s misappropriation was discovered when, after he was
absent for several days, Mission checked the download logs of one of its databases and learned of his
actions. Romaka feigned ignorance and even permitted computer consultants to inspect his
computer . . . .”)
81 AVX Corp. v. Junhee Kim, No. 6:17-cv-00624-MGL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227657 (D.S.C. Mar.
13, 2017).
82 Axis Steel Detailing, Inc. v. Prilex Detailing, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221339 (D. Utah June 29,
2017).
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ordered, namely any Stolen Computer Files stored on the Property Subject to ex parte
seizure at any moment could be transferred or conveyed to a third party such as a
competitor of AVX.”83
In Axis Steel Detailing, defendants were ex-employees of Axis, and started their
own competing company allegedly taking specific confidential software (“Tekla”) files
with them. The court reasoned that “[a]t least some of the Defendants have a high level
of computer technical proficiency and there have been attempts by Defendants in the
past to delete information from computers, including emails and other computer data.
Further, Defendants have shown a willingness to provide false and misleading
information. Accordingly, it appears that Defendants would evade, avoid, or otherwise
not comply with an order issued pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or other equitable remedy.” To address the irreparable injury prong, the
court reasoned, “[i]f ex parte seizure were not allowed, immediate and irreparable
injury to Axis is almost certain. Injury to Axis may include destruction of probative
evidence and a continued disadvantage in the marketplace.”
In the cases following Axis in various district courts around the nation seeking
seizure under the DTSA, ex parte seizure was granted in four instances. In the fifteen
cases before Axis, ex parte seizure (under the DTSA) was granted in only two cases
broadly (Axis and AVX), and in one case narrowly (limited to a single document in
Mission Capital). A summary of all the DTSA cases either directly or indirectly
requesting the ex parte seizure provision, with the corresponding outcome and the
court’s rationale is included in the Appendix.
In general, the courts continued to be selective in granting ex parte seizure.
Nevertheless, the courts appeared more willing to grant Rule 65 TROs (fourteen cases).
The courts also (though less frequently) seemed to prefer other remedies such as a
preliminary injunction, expedited discovery, or a stay order. The main reasons for this
clear preference for Rule 65 remedy were most likely the first (of eight) requirements
listed under 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)84 and the courts’ unwillingness to find the “extraordinary
circumstances” necessary for the ex parte seizure grant.
IV. HOW EFFECTIVE HAS IT BEEN?
A. Why Was Seizure Granted
The notably higher occurrence of the seizure provision grants post-Axis and AVX
appears to be a combination of the specific defendant characteristic and conduct
requirements articulated by earlier courts, including the Axis and AVX courts. This
has guided plaintiffs to identify specific defendant characteristics in their seizure
requests, allowing courts to be less hesitant in approving the seizure when the nature
and location of the trade secrets is identified with particularity.
AVX Corp. v. Junhee Kim, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 227657, at *6.
18 U.S.C.S. § 1836 (“[A]n order issued pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or another form of equitable relief would be inadequate to achieve the purpose of this
paragraph because the party to which the order would be issued would evade, avoid, or otherwise not
comply with such an order.”).
83
84
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1. The Nature of Trade Secret
Under DTSA, the definition of information that qualifies as trade secret has
largely remained unchanged from UTSA and other prior definitions such as the
Restatements.85 Although the list of information qualifying as trade secrets under
DTSA is quite long,86 the nature of trade secrets the courts have found to warrant
“extraordinary circumstances” required by § 1836(b)(2) can be primarily narrowed
down to those that exist in softcopy format and hence are prone to either quick
dissemination to competitors and/or quick destruction by the defendant.87
2. Defendant’s Profile
Defendants’ proficiency with computers and software has played an important
role in cases where the courts perceived the need for expediency and caution in
securing the trade secrets.88 For instance, the court in Solar Connect, LLC v. Endicott89
cited defendants’ “high level of computer and technical proficiency” as a key factor in
deciding that any equitable relief other than an ex parte seizure would be inadequate.
The Axis court too, reasoned that a technically savvy defendant may find ways to hide,
quickly disseminate, or otherwise destroy key evidence in a non ex parte proceeding.90
Another conspicuous and consistent theme among ex parte seizure orders has been
the prior conduct of the defendant. The courts have not treated kindly any instances
of evasion (no-show at hearings or evading service), lies and misrepresentation, or
refusal to comply with requests of turning over the data or ceasing use of trade secrets.
As illustrated by Axis, AVX, Vice Capital,91 Thoroughbread Ventures,92 and Solar
Connect,93 the courts had an easier time finding the “extraordinary circumstance”
required to necessitate ex parte seizure whenever plaintiffs highlighted defendants’
prior lies, non-compliance, and proclivity to evade.
B. Why Seizure Was Denied
Of the forty ex parte seizure cases filed, the courts denied the seizure provision in
thirty-two instances. The predominant reason for denial was finding the use of
alternative remedies to be adequate.94 The primary alternative remedy preferred by
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
18 U.S.C.S. § 1839.
87 18 U.S.C.S. § 1836.
88 Vice Capital LLC et al v. CBD World LLC et al, Docket No. 5:18-cv-00566 (W.D. Okla. Jun 08,
2018).
89 Solar Connect, LLC v. Endicott, No. 2:17-cv-1235, 2018 WL 2386066, at *2 (D. Utah Apr. 6,
2018).
90 See Axis Steel Detailing, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221339 at *4.
91 See, e.g., Vice Capital LLC et al v. CBD World LLC et al, Docket No. 5:18-cv-00566 (W.D. Okla.
Jun 08, 2018).
92 Thoroughbred Ventures, LLC v. Disman, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133697 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8,
2018).
93 See, e.g., Solar Connect, WL 2386066, at *2.
94 See infra Appendix.
85
86
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the courts was the Rule 65(b) temporary restraining order (TRO). In addition to the
thirty-seven cases that expressly sought ex parte seizure, Magnesita discussed
applicability of ex parte seizure under the DTSA, and ultimately rejected it, instead
granting ex parte TRO under Rule 65(b)’s impoundment provision. In every instance
of the seizure provision denial, especially in the early cases, the courts struggled to
find the “extraordinary circumstances” required by § 1836(b)(2). Not having state law
or UTSA jurisprudence to draw from, the courts looked to the Cable Communications
Policy Act (e.g., AT&T Broadband v. Tech Commc’ns, Inc.95) and Lanham Act
jurisprudence (e.g. SATA GmbH & Co. Kg v. Wenzhou New Century International,
Ltd.96) and treaded cautiously. Even as late as in Cochrane USA, INC. v. Filiba,97 filed
in February 2018, the court had difficulty finding “extraordinary circumstances”
despite the plaintiff having highlighted the risk of the defendant fleeing the country
with trade secrets. (DTSA’s legislative history lists defendant’s flight risk as one of the
factors to consider toward finding the “extraordinary circumstance.”98).
In Snively, Inc. v. Blank, et al,99 the court denied ex parte seizure pointing out that
it saw no “irreparable harm,” and granted a Rule 65(b) TRO instead. The absence of
particularity and lack of emphasis on the confidential nature of the stolen information
may also weigh strongly in the court’s the decision-making. In Mission Capital
Advisors LLC v. Romaka,100 the court denied the seizure for all other information
except the contact list because it found that “such information and related facts such
as confidentiality and irreparable harm are not described with sufficient particularity
in the moving papers.”101
In general, the lack of UTSA and state law jurisprudence on civil seizures as well
as the lack of additional guidance (or clear language) in DTSA relating to the
“extraordinary circumstances” requirement left the courts treading cautiously and
denying ex parte seizure when in doubt. Unlike Lanham Act seizures, the factual
situations in a trade secret theft are broader and leave much room for interpretation,
further pushing the courts away from ex parte proceedings. Availability of Rule 65(b)
TRO also appears to be sufficient in most situations where the ex parte nature of the
seizure doesn’t appear critical and where the courts see the likelihood of the defendants
complying with TRO. In addition, the lack of particularity in plaintiff’s motion also
becomes a factor in the courts denying an ex parte seizure.

AT&T Broadband, 381 F.3d at 1319.
SATA GmbH & Co. Kg v. Wenzhou New Century Int’l, Ltd., No. CV 15-08157-BRO (Ex), 2015
WL 6680807, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2015) (ordering ex parte seizure of counterfeit paint reservoirs
where “similarly situated defendants in analogous trademark infringement cases have a history of
disposing of counterfeit goods and refusing to comply with court orders”).
97 Cochrane USA, Inc. v. Filiba, No. 18-341 (EGS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185726 (D.D.C. Mar. 9,
2018).
98 Protection of Trade Secrets: Overview of Current Law and Legislation, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORTS, at 22 (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R43714.html
99 Snively, Inc. v. Blank, et al., Docket No. 4:18-cv-00519 (N.D. Ohio March 06, 2018).
100 See, e.g., Mission Capital Advisors LLC v. Romaka, 2016 WL 11517104 (S.D.N.Y July 22,
2016).
101 Id. at *2.
95
96
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C. Did the Risk of Abuse Materialize?
Opponents of the DTSA and the seizure provision articulated numerous risks.102
Specifically, they contended that the seizure provision language in the DTSA is
“impermissibly vague,” and therefore carries significant potential to cause
anticompetitive harm, especially to small businesses and startups. Further, they
feared that the DTSA implicitly recognized the so-called inevitable disclosure doctrine,
which permitted trade secret holders to obtain injunctive relief against a former
employee if the employee's new job “will inevitably lead [him or her] to rely on the
plaintiff's trade secrets.” This, they feared, would conflict with existing laws in some
states, like California. Another concern expressed was that DTSA would likely
increase the length and cost of trade secret litigation, perhaps through the liberal
discovery permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and would thus result
in less uniformity.
Subsequently, the courts indeed struggled with a consistent definition of
“extraordinary circumstances” in DTSA cases. While some courts weighed the
defendant’s characteristics and prior conduct heavily in making this determination
and ultimately granted the seizure where they saw a prior history of lies or evasion,103
at least one court (D.D.C) refused to find such (“extraordinary”) circumstance even
when the defendant was a flight risk.104 Even though certain factors are starting to
emerge to help determine the “extraordinary circumstances,”105 the sample size is still
low, and no binding appeals court or Supreme Court precedent has emerged.
Despite the lack of clear criteria defining “extraordinary circumstances,” the fear
of abuse, anticompetitive behavior, and harm to innocent third parties has not
materialized. A survey of the forty cases, where the seizure provision was either
requested or granted,106 reveals that none of the defendants have asserted the
“inevitable disclosure” defense prior to or following an ex parte seizure order. Similarly,
“wrongful or excessive seizure” claims also have not been asserted. Admittedly, three
years is a short time window since the enactment and therefore rich case law is yet to
develop. Nevertheless, the perceived risk of abuse, “inevitable disclosure,” and
“wrongful or excessive seizure” has either not played out, or the courts have been
careful to only grant ex parte seizures where the facts strongly supported such action.
Other stated fear, namely that of accidental disclosures by plaintiffs when
pleading under Fed. Rule of Civ. P. Rule 8, does not appear to have materialized either.
While the courts have demanded particularity in granting the seizure, the
particularity requirement is directed at identifying the information or device to be
seized with specificity as in Mission Advisors (where the contact list was identified

See Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 2 at 857.
See, Axis Steel Detailing, Inc. v. Prilex Detailing, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221339 (D. Utah June
29, 2017); AVX Corp. v. Junhee Kim, No. 6:17-cv-00624-MGL, 2017 WL 11316598 (D.S.C. March 13,
2017); Blue Star Land Services LLC v. Coleman et al, Docket No. 5:17-cv-00931, 2017 WL 11309528
(W.D. Okla. Aug 29, 2017).
104 See Cochrane USA, Inc. v. Filiba, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185726 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2018).
105 See supra Part III.
106 See infra Appendix.
102
103
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with particularity), and in Thoroughbred Ventures107 (where the laptop was identified
with particularity) and not its contents.
The fear that the DTSA would result in less uniformity stemmed from the belief
that the DTSA would not follow established state law or UTSA precedent and would
therefore result in inconsistency. DTSA, apart from the seizure provision and some
other minor features, largely follows UTSA, and forty-eight of the fifty states have
adopted UTSA. However, neither UTSA nor any state law had the ex parte seizure
provision, and thus there appears no risk of inconsistent rulings contrary to precedent
as far as the seizure provision goes.
D. Over Three Years In – Who Was Right?
The proponents celebrated the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision for the
expediency it offered in securing the misappropriated information and its cost-shifting
aspects, which shifted some discovery costs to the defendant and to federal
authorities.108 The opponents, on the other hand, feared a rampant misuse of the
seizure provision, and its weaponization to the detriment of small (and sometimes
innocent) companies and startups.
Three years in, the proponents’ early euphoria has been significantly tempered by
the courts’ caution and reluctance to find the “extraordinary circumstances” required
for the seizure provision. Nevertheless, the courts have granted ex parte seizure, and
thereby started to provide guidance for future plaintiffs regarding the criteria
important for a successful ex parte seizure action.
On the other hand, the courts have taken note of the concerns highlighted by the
opponents and have granted ex parte seizure only in limited situations where, inter
alia, the defendant(s) demonstrated a history or tendency to lie or otherwise evade
court’s orders. Furthermore, even when seizures have been granted, they have often
been tailored narrowly to a specific device or a single data file. This limited and careful
exercise of the seizure provision should largely assuage any lingering fears the
opponents may have. Interestingly, even though over 1000 cases have been filed to
date involving the DTSA,109 only around forty to fifty plaintiffs have sought the ex parte
seizure remedy under § 1836(b)(2).110 This alone should provide a significant
reassurance to the opponent community that the constraints placed on the seizure
provision by the DTSA have successfully mitigated risks of its rampant misuse, abuse,
or weaponization.

107 See, e.g., Thoroughbred Ventures, 2018, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133697; see also Mission
Capital Advisors, 2016 WL 11517040.
108 Yvette Joy Liebesman, Ex Parte Seizures Under the DTSA and the Shift of IP Rights
Enforcement, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 383 (2017).
109 BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/search/results/55304edb7963
e43bff3328f7e1009b68 (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (enter search terms “DTSA” and “Trade Secrets” in
Bloomberg Law News search bar).
110 BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/f9de2c7382ab7a0b14a1fd5a
4897ec06 (last visited April 1, 2020) (enter search terms “DTSA” and “Trade Secrets” and “1836(b)(2)”
and “seizure” in Bloomberg Law News search bar).
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E. Is Any Reform Necessary?
Ex parte seizure is here to stay. Whether it is granted or not essentially turns on
whether the courts find the “extraordinary circumstances” that warrant an ex parte
remedy involving the U.S. Marshals Service. The “extraordinary circumstances”
determination is performed pursuant to eight requirements (factors).111 However, the
courts have typically focused on the first two requirements, namely those of the
“inadequacy of Rule 65 equitable relief,” and the finding of “immediate and irreparable
injury.” DTSA’s legislative history notwithstanding, the guidance on what clears the
“extraordinary circumstances” bar and how to determine if Rule 65 equitable relief is
not adequate is still unclear and left to the individual court’s discretion. There is little
jurisprudence on when Rule 65 equitable relief is inadequate in either trade secret law
or any other areas of IP law. A clarification on the circumstance(s), either by legislative
action, or via appellate court precedent, regarding when Rule 65 relief may not be
adequate could be very useful to trade secret owners, employees, and competitors.
To that end, a test is proposed below that includes the analysis of key factors the
courts have emphasized. This test is expected to provide a useful framework for
subsequent plaintiffs to draft their complaints appropriately and to tailor the
requested relief to maximize chances of an ex parte seizure grant. Similarly, such a
framework may also assist the courts in expeditious analysis and disposition of future
ex parte seizure requests.
The first factor of the test focuses on the nature of the trade secret. A trade secret
that is prone to being destroyed quickly or disseminated broadly using digital media
may require ex parte seizure to prevent irreparable harm to plaintiffs. A corollary to
this factor is the defendant’s ability to destroy or quickly disseminate the trade secret.
A computer-savvy defendant would be capable of quick action, and hence ex parte
seizure may be appropriate.
The second factor would determine if the requested relief is particularized to a
narrow set of documents, data, or devices. Ex parte seizure requests identifying specific
documents or devices to be seized may be easier to execute and could thus result in
minimal intrusion or disruption to defendants versus a mass-scale confiscation of large
amounts of documents and devices, which could be highly intrusive, disruptive, and
potentially damaging to unprepared defendants.
The third factor would assess if the defendant has previously evaded or defied
court orders, or otherwise has a history of misrepresentation. A prior history of evasion
or misrepresentation by the defendant may necessitate ex parte seizure due to a strong
likelihood of the defendant resorting to similar behavior in response to a Rule 65 TRO,
thus rendering it inadequate.
The fourth factor would consider the time lapse between the misappropriation and
the complaint. A complaint lodged a considerable time after the trade secret was
allegedly misappropriated would weigh heavily against the seizure provision. The
extended time lapse would imply that the threat of evidence destruction or information
dissemination is either absent or has already been carried out. Thus, an ex parte
seizure would not serve a meaningful purpose.

111

See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(2) (2018).
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Finally, the fifth factor would consider the flexibility of the timing of the ex parte
seizure. If the ex parte seizure could be carried out after-hours, the risk of reputational
harm to the business and its goodwill erosion are mitigated.
Curiously, the Magnesita court skirted this issue of ex parte seizure under DTSA
entirely by finding an ex parte Rule 65(b)(1) TRO with impoundment to be an adequate
(and available) remedy instead of granting ex parte seizure. The practical result of the
order was identical to that of an ex parte seizure, except that the US Marshal’s
involvement was not necessitated. The Magnesita finding remains unchallenged and
remains good law within the Northern District of Indiana. Other federal courts too,
may find it persuasive where an ex parte proceeding is critical to preserve evidence but
where a U.S. Marshal’s involvement may not be necessary. Further clarification, either
by legislative action, or via appellate court precedent, regarding when an ex parte Rule
65(b)(1) TRO with impoundment is appropriate and what circumstances necessitate
an ex parte seizure involving the U.S. Marshal may be useful to future plaintiffs in
order to seek an appropriately tailored relief.
Because the success of a Rule 65(b)(1) remedy essentially hinges on the likelihood
of the defendant’s compliance with a TRO, a multi-factor test, described below, to
determine the defendant’s likelihood of compliance with a Rule 65 TRO, may prove to
be of some utility.
The first factor of the test would consider if the parties are already involved in a
broader litigation. An ongoing litigation between parties establishes an existing
mechanism for exchanging information and provides a strong disincentive for bad-faith
behavior such as evading court order or destroying evidence, for such actions may
adversely impact the rest of the litigation. In such circumstances, a Rule 65 TRO with
impoundment may be adequate, and an ex parte seizure requiring U.S. Marshal may
be unnecessary.
The second factor to consider would be the importance of reputational harm to the
defendant. Where the defendant may be averse to reputational harm resulting from a
law enforcement-guided ex parte seizure, a Rule 65 TRO with impoundment may elicit
adequate compliance. A highly-placed officer of a company, a public figure, a large
corporation, or a B-2-C (Business to Consumer) enterprise may be especially concerned
of their public reputation, and therefore would be unlikely to disobey–even in the
absence of a U. S. Marshal–a Rule 65 TRO.
The third factor would consider the defendant’s prior history of evasion, noncompliance, or misrepresentation. Where the defendant has not demonstrated any
prior bad-faith behavior or disregard for court orders, a Rule 65 TRO with
impoundment may be adequate to secure the pertinent documents and devices.
This three-factor test could clarify for plaintiffs if they should even attempt to
clear the high bar of “extraordinary circumstances” required for ex parte seizure
grants. Instead, upon applying this test, plaintiffs may elect to seek the relatively
easier (and favored) path of a Rule 65 TRO with impoundment, effectively providing
them the same relief as an ex parte seizure, but without the additional showing of the
“extraordinary circumstances.”
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V. CONCLUSION
DTSA provided a federal civil cause of action to trade secret plaintiffs and the
seizure provision provided a potent weapon capable of inflicting quick and effective
control on trade secret dissemination. However, the seizure provision also invoked
much fear in and opposition from the academic community–principally for its potential
for abuse by plaintiffs against unsuspecting and unprepared defendants. The three
years of jurisprudence since DTSA’s enactment tells a different story however. Indeed,
such potential for abuse has not materialized and only a handful of DTSA cases even
requested the ex parte seizure remedy. More importantly, the courts were vigilant, and
struck down most of the ex parte seizure requests by finding the “extraordinary
circumstances” absent or by finding a Rule 65 TRO to be an adequate relief instead. In
the nine instances where ex parte seizure was granted, the courts provided guidance
on the factors that positively influenced the grant. The proposed framework of two
separate multi-factor tests based on DTSA ex parte seizure jurisprudence so far, could
therefore prove useful to both the plaintiff and the defendant communities in tailoring
their complaints and responses, and in requesting appropriate relief.
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VI. APPENDIX

Date
Filed
(Date
Closed)
6/14/2016
(Closed
12/15/2017)

6/22/2016

7/19/2016
(Closed
8/3/2016)
7/25/2016
(Closed
8/19/2016)

8/2/2016
(Closed
3/5/2019)

9/29/2016
(Closed
9/25/2017)

11/1/2016
(Closed
4/19/2018)

Ex Parte
Seizure
Granted

Dazzle Software
II, LLC, et al. v.
Kinney, et al.,
No. 2:16-cv12191 (E.D.
Mich.)
Mission Capital
Advisors LLC v.
Romaka, No.
1:16-CV-05878
(S.D. N.Y.)
Panera, LLC v.
Nettles, et al.,
No. 4:16-cv01181
(E.D. Mo.)
Earthbound
Corporation et al.
v. Mitek USA, et
al., Docket No.
2:16-cv-01150
(W.D. Wash.)
Balearia
Caribbean Ltd.,
Corp., v. Calvo,
No. 1:16-cv23300 (S.D. Fla.)

No112

No

Yes

Yes

Rule 65(b)

Court granted partial
Seizure narrowly
limited to a contact list.

Yes

No113

Rule 65(b)

Rule 65 analysis
satisfied.

Yes

Yes114

Rule 65(b)

PI and TRO requiring
seizure requested by
plaintiff.

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

Moxie Pest
Control LP v.
Romney, et al.,
No. 3:16-cv02775 (N.D. Tex.)
Jones Printing
LLC v. Adams
Lithographing
Co., et al., No.
1:16-cv-00442
(E.D. Tenn.)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Court granted TRO.
Court cites to AT&T
Broadband v. 381,
F.3d. at 1319, and
explains that to invoke
seizure standard,
defendant must have
concealed evidence or
disregarded court
orders in the past.
The court denied
seizure requested and
asked Plaintiff to
amend complaint to
focus on TRO.
Court said allegations
were conclusory, the
high bar required by
civil seizures was not
met, and that Plaintiff
did not show why TRO
under Rule 65 will be
inadequate.

Defendant was a third party.
No ex parte seizure was requested.
114 No ex parte seizure was requested.
112
113

Alternate
Provision
Used
(if any)

Def. an
Employee
?

Parties

Rationale/
Analysis
Court declined ex parte
basis. Required notice
being given to
Defendant.

Rule 65(b)
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12/9/2016
(Closed
1/25/2017)

Magnesita
Refractories
Company v.
Mishra, No. 2:16cv-00524 (N.D.
Ind.)

Yes

Yes115

Rule 65(b)

12/9/2016
(Closed
3/12/20)

Sapienza v.
Trahan, et al.,
No. 6:16-cv01701 (W.D. La.)

Yes

No

NDA

1/4/2017
(Closed
8/6/2017)

OOO Brunswick
Rail
Management, et
al. v. Sultanov, et
al., No. 5:17-cv00017 (N.D. Cal.)

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

1/17/2017
(Closed
4/2/2018)

Digital Ally, Inc.
v. Corum, No.
2:17-cv-02026 (D.
Kan).

Yes

No

1/25/2017
(Closed
7/31/2018)

OOO Brunswick
Rail
Management, et
al. v. Ostling, No.
3:17-cv-00114 (D.
Conn.)
Oncam
Incorporated v.
Tonn
Investments
LLC, et al., No.
2:17-cv-00501 (D.
Ariz.)
AVX Corporation
v. Kim, No. 6:17cv-00624 (D.S.C.)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Denied as "moot"
pursuant to a dismissal
of the case.

Yes

Yes

Court reasoned that D
has lied before and
therefore the likelihood
of him evading,
avoiding, or otherwise
not complying with
Rule 65 order was

2/15/2017
(Closed
4/7/2017)

3/7/2017
(Closed
9/28/2017)

115

No ex parte seizure was requested.

Rule 65(b)

Court stated that a
seizure under Rule 65
is permitted, and Rule
64 need not be
implicated as Rule 64
is limited to seizures to
effectuate judgment
satisfaction whereas
Rule 65 seizure is used
to preserve/protect
evidence.
Court met and
conferred with counsels
and had Defendant
agree to confidentiality
and NDA while further
enjoining them from
disclosing the alleged
trade secrets to any
third parties.
Court ordered the
laptop and phone to be
brought to hearing and
kept secure until then as such seizure was not
needed per court. But
court approved the exparte TRO motion
citing attorney affidavit
requirement as
satisfied.
The court ignored the
(passingly made)
Seizure request and
denied the TRO
motion.
See above.
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adequately
demonstrated.
3/28/2017
(Closed
5/29/2018)
4/3/2017
(Closed
10/15/2018)

4/4/2017
(Closed
10/15/2018)

4/7/2017
(Closed
9/28/2018)
5/18/2017
(Closed
9/7/2017)

5/24/2017
(Closed
10/15/2018)

8/7/2017
(Closed
6/21/2019)

116

Val-Chris
Investments, Inc.
v. Does 1-10, No.
8:17-cv-00561
(C.D. Cal.)
Document
Technologies,
Inc., et al. v.
West, et al., No.
1:17-cv-02405
(S.D.N.Y)

No

Yes

No

Document
Technologies,
Inc., et al. v.
Hosford, No.
1:17-cv-02586
(N.D. Ill.)
KCG Americas
LLC, et al. v.
Zhang, No. 5:17cv-01953 (N.D.
Cal.)
Axis Steel
Detailing v.
Prilex Detailing,
et al., No. 2:17cv-00428 (D.
Utah)

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Document
Technologies,
Inc., et al. v.
Hosford, No.
1:17-cv-03917
(S.D.N.Y.)
The Revolution
FMO, LLC v.
Mitchell, No.
4:17-cv-02220
(E.D. Mo.)

Yes

No

No116

No

Defendant was a non-employee agent.

Rule 55(b)

The court found a
default judgment to be
an adequate remedy.
Seizure denied by court
finding Preliminary
Injunction (PI) to be
more appropriate. PI
was ultimately denied
as well finding that
plaintiff failed to show
a likelihood of success
on the merits.
See above DTI (S.D.
NY case).

Seizure was not
discussed by the court.
PI motion also denied
finding no likelihood of
irreparable harm.
Finding other equitable
remedies available
because defendants
would otherwise not
comply with a Rule 65
order and Defendants
held expert level
computer proficiency
with a history of
deleting digital data.
See above DTI (S.D.
NY case).

Parties tried to settle
during an initial ex
parte hearing but the
discussions broke
down. Subsequently
TRO was sought by P.
D agreed / proposed a
protective order (nondisclosure) instead.
TRO was denied.
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8/29/2017

Blue Star Land
Services LLC v.
Coleman, et al.,
No. 5:17-cv00931 (W.D.
Okla.)

9/14/2017
(Closed
11/8/2017)

9/27/2017

11/29/2017

2/13/2018

117
118

Yes

Yes

Inksoft
Incorporated v.
Webby Central
LLC, No. 2:17-cv03168 (D. Ariz.)

No117

No

Orochem Tech.,
Inc. v. Whole
Hemp Co, LLC,
et al., No. 1:17cv-06983 (N.D.
Ill.)
Solar Connect v.
Endicott et al.,
No. 2:17-cv01235 (D. Utah)

No118

No

Rule 65(b)

Yes

Yes

Rule 65(b)

Cochrane usa,
Inc., et al. v.
Filiba, et al., No.
1:18-cv-00341
(D.D.C)

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

Defendant was a competitor.
Defendant was a partner.

240

Given the manner in
which Defendants
allegedly took the trade
secret(s), their alleged
duplicity with Plaintiff,
and considering the
nature of the trade
secret(s), an Order
pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65 would be
ineffective. Defendants
could easily copy the
information onto
another computer or
other storage Case
5:17-cv-00931-R
Document 10 Filed
08/31/17 Page 2 of 5 3
media without the
knowledge of Plaintiff
or the Court. Further,
Defendants’ prior
actions demonstrate a
willingness to evade or
ignore the law.
Court found that the P
did not carry the
burden of
demonstrating the
damage that will result
if the adverse party is
notified, and also did
not demonstrate any
efforts to notify the D
of the request for
injunctive relief.
Seizure not granted. A
PI hearing ordered.

The court granted the
civil seizure. It cited
the D's high level of
computer and technical
proficiency and prior
attempts to delete data
and hide information.
Court found no
"extraordinary
circumstance" when
Plaintiff contended
that Defendant would
flee the country and
could disseminate the
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secret to another
competitor
3/8/2018
(Closed
10/4/2018)

Snively, Inc. v.
Blank, et al., No.
4:18-cv-00519
(N.D. Ohio)

Yes

No

4/18/2018
(Closed
7/19/2018)

The Center for
Advancing
Innovation, Inc.
v. Bahreini, et
al., No. 8:18-cv01119 (D. Md.)

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

4/20/2018
(Closed
5/7/2019)

Lokring
Technology, LLC
v. Elliott, No.
1:18-cv-00907
(N.D. Ohio)

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

4/30/2018
(Closed
8/8/2018)

Thoroughbred
Ventures, LLC v.
Disman, et al.
No. 4:18-cv00318 (E.D. Tex).

Yes

Yes

5/18/2018
(Closed
11/6/2019)

International
Automotive
Technicians
Network, Inc., et
al. v. Thomas
Winzig, et al.,
No. 2:18-cv04208 (C.D. Cal.)

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

Court saw no
possibility of
"irreparable harm" and
civil seizure was not
granted. TRO was
initially granted but
later revoked.
Court rejected civil
seizure demand and
proceeded to review
Rule 65 TRO motions.
Not ex parte.
Ultimately, no
irreparable harm was
found.
Court did not consider
a separate plea for
Seizure. Focused on
TRO instead. Denied
TRO as moot on the
merits.
Laptop possession
crucial, and without
seizure, D could
continue to harm P by
propagating P's trade
secrets. Seizure
necessary to mitigate
harm.
Seizure denied for
multiple reasons: 1. no
extraordinary
circumstance showing
made as relating to
"defendant not
complying with court
order" or "otherwise
evade," because D had
already threatened
litigation on the same
issues, 2. D had
apparently turned
"pale" at the threat of
having her laptop
taken away, and 3. the
court found the time
lapse between the
defendant's conduct
and the complaint to be
long-enough so as to
not warrant an
immediate civil seizure.
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6/8/2018
(Closed
2/13/2020)

Vice Capital
LLC, et al. v.
CBD World LLC,
et al., No. 5:18cv-00566 (W.D.
Okla.)

No119

Yes

8/23/2018
(Closed
8/16/2019)

Pearl Insurance
Group LLC v.
Baker, et al., No.
0:18-cv-02353
(D.S.C.)

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

10/31/2018
(Closed
6/21/2019)

Western Union
Company, The, et
al. v. Michael,
No. 1:18-cv02797 (D. Colo.)
Hayes
Healthcare
Services, LLC., et
al. v. Meacham,
No. 0:19-cv60113 (S.D. Fla.)
Austar
International
Limited v.
Austarpharma
LlC, et al.,
No. 2:19-cv08356 (D.N.J.)

Yes

No

Rule 65(b)

Yes

No

Preliminary
Injunction

No120

No

Yes

No

1/11/2019
(Closed
9/13/2019)

3/11/2019

3/18/2019
(Closed
8/21/2019)

119
120

Defendant was a Franchisee.
Defendant was a non-employee third party.
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Defendants have
improperly retained
Plaintiffs’ customer list
and have shown a
willingness to provide
false and misleading
information to said
customers.
Court granted TRO but
wanted to schedule a
hearing on Civil
Seizure with
Defendants having
briefed on the issue.
Defendants had not
shown tendency to
disobey court orders.
Thus ex parte seizure
not needed.
Court did not consider
a separate plea for
Seizure. Focused on
preliminary injunction
by giving defendant
notice of action.
Ex parte seizure was
alluded to but never
specifically asked as
the relief. Only a
"seizure" was
requested. The court
proceeded to provide
notice to defendants of
the action. The harm
alleged was not of the
nature that
necessitated or gave
rise to "extraordinary
circumstance" required
to issue ex parte
seizure.
Plaintiff requested
either a preliminary
injunction or a
permanent injunction
or an ex parte seizure.
The court thus
proceeded to summon
defendant to answer
the complaint, thereby
deciding that ex parte
action was
unnecessary.
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4/29/2019

LG Chem, Ltd. et
al. v. SK
Innovation Co.,
Ltd. et al., No.
1:19-cv-00776 (D.
Del.)

Yes

No

5/30/2019
(Closed
7/11/2019)

Pallet
Consultants
Corp. v. AJ
Cheponis, et al.,
No. 0:19-cv61359 (S.D. Fla.)
Ultra Premium
Services, LLC v.
OFS
International,
LLC, et al., No.
4:19-cv-02277
(S.D. Tex.)

Yes

No

No

No

6/25/2019

Stay

Expedited
Discovery

243

Motion to stay granted
due to a pending action
before ITC. Parties are
involved in parallel
litigation before ITC
and thus ex parte
seizure is unnecessary.
The court issued
summons to defendants
to provide answer to
the complaint. Unclear
why ex parte seizure
was not considered.
The court did not find
the extraordinary
circumstances to
consider ex parte
seizure. Instead it
considered a TRO and
ultimately declined to
grant it in favor of an
expedited discovery
order.

